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Neuroeconomics investigates the neural mechanisms underlying decisions about rewarding or
punishing outcomes (‘economic’ decisions). It combines the knowledge about the behavioural
phenomena of economic decisions with the mechanistic explanatory power of neuroscience. Thus, it
is about the neurobiological foundations of economic decision making. It is hoped that by ‘opening
the box’ we can understand how decisions about gains and losses are directed by the brain of the
individual decision maker. Perhaps we can even learn why some decisions are apparently paradoxical
or pathological. The knowledge could be used to create situations that avoid suboptimal decisions
and harm.
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Recently,acolleague,ProfessorofEconomics,remarked
in a widely distributed email that neuroeconomics
is about the silliest thing he could think of. Upon which
another colleague, an understanding psychiatrist,
replied that many neuroscientists assume that the
brain controls the behaviour. This is the sort of
argument and discussion one can also hear, with
different levels of intensity, in the lecture halls and
corridors of conferences. Who is right? Does neuro-
economics primarily produce amusing illustrations on
what science can do with the world or does it help to
solve certain issues in economics and neuroscience?
And what do the neuroscientists think after they have
recovered from the shock that yet another discipline
enters the picture while they are trying to understand
the functions and mechanisms of the human and
animal brain (and mind)?
When neuroeconomics started less than 10 years
ago, the nicely coherent economic utility theory with
its more than 200 years of tradition had shown
serious cracks in its power of explanation incurred by
inconsistent behavioural preferences and so-called
irrational decisions. Prospect theory provided expla-
nations for some of these problems but still lacked a
coherent framework. The contentious issues might be
resolved, and a new economic decision theory emerge,
by investigating the brains of decision makers. The
hope was that investigations of biological mechanisms
could help to discard those alternatives for which there
was no neural mechanism. The promise might be
exaggerated but it helped to drive the ﬁeld into a ﬂurry
of human brain imaging and animal neurophysiological
studies investigating the neural basis of economic
decision making. What neuroeconomics is less likely
to provide is an explanation for economic phenomena
beyond the inﬂuence of the individual decision maker,
including market forces and the laws of supply and
demand. However, even these safe ﬁelds outside the
reach of heretic neuroeconomics might be affected,
as demands can be manipulated and might depend,
among other factors, on the brains of individuals
making decisions.
In contrast to the economists, the neuroscientists
had few problems with neuroeconomics and were quick
to use its potential for future studies. Neuroeconomics
builds on behavioural economics, and behavioural
imaging and neurophysiological studies have an
insatiable appetite for controlled and quantiﬁable
behavioural tasks. Any addition to the repertoire of
behavioural paradigms is welcome, even more so when
they come packaged into neat theories that appear, at
ﬁrst sight, consistent with measurable evidence.
Despite the wonderful tests and theories developed
over more than a hundred years by experimental
psychologists, the tasks emerging from behavioural
economics allowed neurophysiologists to connect
behavioural phenomena that seemed far apart and
provided long-desired explanations and quantitation
through surprisingly simple and intuitive tests. In
addition, behavioural game theory allowed neuro-
science to move into the domain of controlled and
quantiﬁable social behaviour. No wonder neuroscien-
tists had no problems adopting neuroeconomic
thoughts and paradigms.
This special issue presents examples of current
work in neuroeconomics in order to convey some of
the enthusiasm and insights for economic and
neuroscience research. Informed decision making
requires the neural coding of basic decision
parameters about predictive information on future
outcomes and their uncertainty (risk and ambigu-
ity), both for gains and losses. The ﬁrst three
contributions treat exactly these issues in humans
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studies that provide insights into brain mechanisms
engaged with the anticipation of gains and losses,
in particular the striatum and insula. However,
primary aversive biological outcomes such as
electrical shocks need to be investigated separately
from the more conditioned nature of monetary
losses, and the fear induced by shocks impacts
powerfully on decisions and illustrates the role of
negative emotions in decision making. The issue is
taken up in the paper by Delgado et al. (2008),w h o
investigate the basic mechanisms underlying pre-
dictive aversive learning, notably aversive prediction
errors. The contribution by Schultz et al. (2008)
describes the discovery of risk and ambiguity signals
in the human and animal brain. These signals do
not only inform the individual about the incomple-
teness of information about outcomes but could
also modulate the perceived value of outcomes
according to ﬁnancial decision theory. For example,
riskavoidersattribute less valuetooutcomes thatareless
certain.Thesedataillustratehowassumptionsofspeciﬁc
economic theories, such as the mean variance approach
of ﬁnances, may be related to neurobiological
mechanisms, thus putting a neurobiological basis to
certain economic theories. The studies also demonstrate
how such neurobiological data become interpretable
through economic theories, thus helping to understand
brain function.
Once we advanced our understanding of the neural
coding of basic decision parameters, including uncer-
tainty, we need to consider other key factors
contributing to decisions, notably temporal delays,
and then put the data into the larger perspective.
Outcomes that occur later have less subjective value
for the decision maker, maybe because they appear
less certain. The contribution by Rick & Loewenstein
(2008) argues for a speciﬁc appearance of uncertainty
in distant outcomes. Later outcomes are less tangible
for the decision maker who therefore assigns less value
to them. However, these decision parameters are not
set in stone. Rather, outcomes are valued according to
the very simple rule of survival and competition in the
face of scarce nutritional sources, and the capacity to
do this in a satisfactory manner ultimately determines
the survival of the species (or rather its genes) during
biological evolution. This is the perspective that may
help us to understand why preferences and risk
attitudes shift, and our neural concepts need to
accommodate such changes. The contribution by
Watson & Platt (2008) addresses the issue and
provides examples of brain mechanisms that can be
best understood on the basis of theories of behavioural
ecology. Taken together, these reviews describe the
properties and constraints of basic economic decision
parameters and attempt to outline the functions of
brain systems that have evolved to deal with these
crucial biological functions.
One of the most novel contributions of beha-
vioural economics and game theory to neuroscience
is to provide a quantiﬁable handle on social
processes. We are privileged to have several such
contributions dealing with behaviour, human
imaging and neurophysiology. The contribution by
Lakshminaryanan et al. (2008) describes how mon-
keys make the same biased decisions that are typical
for humans and which gave rise to prospect theory,
namely the endowment effect. In addition, monkeys
can use tokens for exchanging edible goods. These
data indicate that paradoxical choice phenomena not
covered by utility theory and the use of abstract
currency exist also in non-human animals, suggesting
similar neural correlates. The contribution by Seo &
Lee (2008) uses formal games in monkeys against a
computer to study the role of reinforcement on game
performance and to assess the contribution of speciﬁc
cortical areas to the critical behavioural components of
game performance. Prefrontal neurons track previous
movement choices and reward history, whereas anterior
cingulate tracks primarily reward history. These data are
compatible with previously known physiological func-
tions of these regions and demonstrate how novel
behavioural situations such as formal games allow us
to understand how speciﬁc cortical areas contribute to
richer but nevertheless well-controlled behavioural
situations than previously tested in laboratory settings.
The contributions by Frith & Singer (2008) and
by Krueger et al. (2008) carry the investigations
of formal games from monkeys to humans. They come
with the different but convergent perspectives of
behavioural game theory and cognitive psychology,
respectively. They review various games such as Prison-
er’s dilemma, dictator and ultimatum games and trust
and investment games and describe the social com-
ponents of performance in these games such as
cooperation, defection, social distance, sympathy and
empathy, trust, fairness, resentment of unfair offers,
reciprocation, anger and disgust and altruistic punish-
ment. The brain processes underlying social interactions
tested by game playing involve reinforcement with
prediction error coding, representation of sensations
and emotions in others, and mentalizing of the other
player’s intentions. They identify the corresponding
neural correlates in the striatum (reward prediction
error), insula (empathy and resentment of unfair
treatment), orbitofrontal cortex (cooperation) and
medial frontal cortex (mentalizing). Taken together,
the game studies provide us with excellent examples
of brain mechanisms underlying decisions in the
social domain.
We hope you will have fun reading these papers,
appreciate the promise of neuroeconomics and proﬁt
from the insights emerging from this amazing new
avenue of research. These are exciting times for both
economists and neuroscientists.
July 2008
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